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Abstract—Economic development implies that the efficiency of firms in
developing countries starts approaching that of firms from advanced
economies. Various development policies have been pursued to achieve
this convergence. We test for this convergence in two economies that
represent alternative models of implementing market-oriented develop-
ment policies: the Czech Republic and Russia. Using 1992–2000 panel
data on virtually all medium and large industrial firms in each country
and accounting for endogeneity of ownership, we find that foreign owner-
ship markedly improved the efficiency of firms, whereas domestic private
ownership did not; domestic firms are not catching up to the (world) effi-
ciency standard given by foreign-owned firms. This is due in part to a
slower growth of efficiency in domestic firms over time. However, for-
eigners’ acquisitions of more efficient domestic firms are also contribut-
ing to the gap. Domestic firms closer to the frontier are not more likely to
catch up than firms farther from the frontier, although foreign firms do
exhibit this behavior. The distance of Russian firms to the efficiency fron-
tier is much larger than that of Czech firms. Nevertheless, after nearly a
decade of reforms, neither model of development has resulted in conver-
gence of domestic firms to the world standard.
I. Introduction
ECONOMIC development is often viewed as a processthrough which living standards in poor countries con-
verge to those of the rich countries.1 A necessary condition
for this convergence is that the efficiency of firms in devel-
oping countries starts approaching the efficiency of firms in
advanced economies. The need for efficiency improvement
becomes especially relevant as globalization induces more
intense worldwide competition. The development policies
pursued over the past three decades by many governments
included privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
stimulating the entry of new firms and encouraging foreign
direct investment (FDI) and trade. Given the depth and
breadth of initial distortions and the fundamental nature of
subsequent reforms in the formerly centrally planned and
state-owned transition economies, one may expect the posi-
tive effects of globalization and market-oriented policies to
be even larger and more detectable in these countries than
in other developing economies. In this paper, we examine
whether these policies have propelled domestic firms in two
prototypical transition economies to converge to the world
standard.
The effectiveness of market-oriented development poli-
cies in the transition economies has been subject to debate.
One group argues that these policies have not contributed to
the convergence process and that excessively rapid privati-
zation and other measures account for the relatively poor
performance of the former Soviet bloc countries in the early
transition (Stiglitz, 1999). Others claim that the problems of
the less successful transition economies have been brought
about by insufficiently rapid and comprehensive policies
(Sachs, 1996). A nuanced view maintains that an increase
in competition encourages innovative behavior of firms and
countries that are near the efficiency frontier but stifles
those that lag significantly behind (Aghion et al., 2005,
2008; Acemoglu, Aghion, Zilibotti, 2002, 2006).2 Finally, a
model by Monge-Naranjo (2008) proposes that in the short
run, FDI reduces the efficiency of domestic firms and
increases the dispersion of their efficiency, but in the long
run, domestic firms catch up with firms in the developed
world.
At the microlevel, there is a literature questioning whether
firms privatized to domestic owners have become more pro-
ductive than SOEs and whether foreign ownership improves
efficiency in the emerging market economies. The evidence
from numerous studies has shown that firms with foreign
ownership are more productive than their domestically
owned counterparts in all parts of the world.3 However,
the evidence on the performance effects of privatization
is mixed, ranging from those that find no or limited systema-
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1 This ‘‘convergence’’ view in development economics dates at least as
far back as Lewis (1955).
2 Interestingly, the converse of this hypothesis was proposed by Findlay
(1978, p. 2) over three decades ago; he posited that ‘‘the rate of technolo-
gical progress in relatively ‘backward’ region is an increasing function of
the gap between its own level of technology and that of the ‘advanced’
region which improves at a constant rate, and the degree to which it is
open to direct foreign investment.’’ See Kosova (2010) for a review.
3 See Caves (1974) for one of the first papers in this literature; Terrell
and Svejnar (1989) for evidence in Senegal; Aitken and Harrison (1999)
for evidence in Venezuela; and Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Estrin
et al. (2009) for evidence in transition economies.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, November 2012, 94(4): 981–999
 2012 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
tic effect (Bevan, Estrin, & Schaffer, 1999; Hanousek,
Kocenda, & Svejnar, 2007) to those that cautiously conclude
that privatization improves firm performance (Megginson &
Netter, 2001) and those that confidently conclude that priva-
tization improves performance (Djankov & Murrell, 2002;
Shirley & Walsh, 2000).4 In a survey of the evidence from
transition economies, Estrin et al. (2009) draw on a number
of studies, including the present one and a contemporaneous
study by Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2006), and conclude
that privatization to foreign owners has a positive effect,
while the effect of privatization on domestic owners is
ambiguous.
We examine the evolution of efficiency of industrial firms
in two alternative prototypes of transition economies, the
Czech Republic and Russia. The two countries constitute
useful case studies because they maintained central planning
and virtually no private ownership and FDI inflows until the
start of the transition, both rapidly privatized most state
assets, and yet they otherwise pursued very different paths
in opening their economies to market forces.5 The Czech
Republic represents the Central and East European (CEE)
model, which emphasizes the opening up to trade and capital
flows, developing a functioning market economy, and estab-
lishing institutions, rules, and regulations that make a coun-
try eligible for accession to the EU. Russia represents the
model of the countries in the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (CIS), which have remained more closed to
world trade and FDI and have changed their laws, regula-
tions, and institutions more slowly and without harmonizing
them with those of the EU.6 Unlike earlier studies, we have
data for a relatively long period (nine years) after the start of
the reforms and can therefore explore issues and perform
tests that could not be carried out earlier.
We use the efficiency of foreign-owned firms in each
country as the benchmark for the world standard. This
choice reflects the finding by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple
(2004) that it is the most efficient firms in advanced econo-
mies that engage in FDI. By the mid-1990s, foreign-owned
firms were well established in all the major sectors of the
two economies, and it is therefore plausible that the best
ones were operating at the world standard.7 Moreover,
using the performance of foreign-owned firms in each coun-
try as a proxy for the world efficiency standard is superior
to using the performance of firms operating in advanced
market economies since the latter approach is plagued by
problems related to different institutions and shocks in the
advanced versus transition economies, as well as by pro-
blems related to carrying out comparisons in the presence
of wide exchange rate fluctuations and other cross-country
conversion issues.
The performance of domestic firms in emerging markets
may lag behind that of foreign firms for a number of rea-
sons, including less efficient use of inputs, inability to
charge high prices due to inferior product quality or market-
ing, fewer intangible assets, higher cost of capital, more fre-
quent location in highly competitive industries, more ineffi-
cient vertical integration, and limited use of outsourcing. In
order to capture as many of these factors as possible, we
focus on revenues of the firm as our dependent variable,
examining the evolution in efficiency with which firms with
different ownership generate revenues from inputs. Our
approach thus allows for domestic firms to gain or fall
further behind in efficiency over time on account of any of
the factors we have noted. Since transition is a dynamic
process, we do not presume that firms are in a technical or
economic steady state, but rather that they are trying to
improve their performance by discovering new methods of
production, importing technologies, launching new pro-
ducts, learning new managerial and marketing techniques,
and promoting their brand names and products.8
Our findings are based on comprehensive panel data
drawn from the Registries of Industrial Enterprises of the
Russian and Czech Statistical Offices. Our samples approach
the populations of large and medium-sized industrial enter-
prises and cover the period 1985 to 2000. Aside from Brown
et al. (2006), no other study uses such comprehensive data
on manufacturing firms with as many annual observations as
we do.
Brown et al. (2006) examined the effects of privatization
in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine over the 1985–
2002 period. Our study differs from theirs in five important
respects. First, we include data on both old and new firms
rather than using only firms that existed under communism.
As may be seen from table 1, new firms represent a large
share of all firms, and including them provides a more com-
plete and accurate picture of what has happened in these
economies. In particular, we are able to examine the nature
of the gap between all private and state-owned firms and
distinguish the privatization effect from the start-up effect
on performance. Second, rather than estimating just the cen-
tral tendency, we also examine the efficiency effects of
ownership across the distribution of firms by efficiency,
using quantile analysis. Third, unlike Brown et al. (2006),
we handle more systematically the important issues of
4 There is also a literature on the effects of nationalization (see Cole,
2009).
5 See Ericson (1991) for a description of an intact Soviet model. Many
other transition economies do not represent equally clear-cut shifts of
regime. Hungary and Poland, for instance, introduced important reforms
already under communism and hence operated with looser central plan-
ning, significant private ownership, and FDI.
6 For example, in 1997 the Business Environment and Enterprise Per-
formance Survey carried out by the World Bank and the EBRD (1999,
2002) found that 40.1% of the sample in the Czech Republic, as compared
to only 20.8% in Russia, believed that the legal system would uphold con-
tract and property rights.
7 If the best foreign-owned firms were below the frontier, then we
would underestimate the gap that domestic firms need to cover to catch
up. Since we find a lack of catch-up to the foreign-owned firms, our
results would be even stronger if the frontier were higher.
8 While providing some evidence related to the reallocation of resources
across firms (e.g., acquisitions), we do not examine this topic in this
paper.
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endogeneity of ownership and input choice, and we do so in
several different ways. Brown et al. try to tackle the pro-
blem of endogeneity by allowing for firm-specific fixed
effects (FE) or linearly time-varying, firm effects (FE&FT).
Their approach controls for input endogeneity to the ex-
tent that input use is correlated with fixed or linearly time-
varying, unobserved firm-specific effects. It also controls for
the possibility that foreign firms may acquire domestic firms
that are more efficient and have a different linear trend in the
rate of change of efficiency. However, their method does not
control for other unobserved types of productivity differ-
ences, such as nonlinear effects. Since the transition induced
a highly nonlinear (U-shaped) performance in all the econo-
mies and industries, allowing only for linear effects may not
be an adequate way to tackle endogeneity. Moreover, using
FE or FE&FT increases considerably the noise-to-signal
ratio in the data and makes it difficult to discern if statisti-
cally insignificant coefficients are caused by the absence of
an effect or by the noise induced by the estimation proce-
dure. We tackle the endogeneity of ownership in four alter-
native ways: by using three different sets of instrumental
variables (IVs) and a weighted matching (WM) method. We
also handle the endogeneity of input choice by estimating
random and fixed-effects equations, as well as the Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) and Blundell and Bond (2000) models.
Fourth, we check the robustness of estimated ownership
effects by using different measures of foreign ownership and
control for the fact that foreign investors may locate in less
competitive industries. Fifth, unlike Brown et al. (2006), we
examine if the dynamics of the evolution of firm efficiency
varies with ownership and proximity to the efficiency fron-
tier. Specifically, we estimate whether firms with different
types of ownership have different probabilities of moving to
the frontier, converge to different steady-state levels of effi-
ciency, or converge to their steady-state level at different
speeds.
We first estimate the average efficiency effects of the
four different types of ownership (foreign, domestic private,
state, and mixed) during the entire 1992–2000 period,
checking the robustness of our results with several estima-
tion methods. We next allow the efficiency of firms with
different ownership to vary linearly and quadratically over
time and also estimate the efficiency effects of ownership
over three subperiods characterizing the early (1992–1994),
middle (1995–1997) and mature (1998–2000) transition.9
Our findings for the entire 1992–2000 period are sobering:
while the average efficiency effect of foreign ownership
relative to state ownership (our base) is positive and large
in both countries, the effect of domestic private and mixed
ownership compared to SOEs is only about 0 to 11% in the
Czech Republic and it is negative (about 3% to 8% in our
preferred specifications) in Russia. Moreover, in the Czech
Republic, foreign-owned firms experience a faster annual
rate of increase in efficiency than all domestically owned
firms, while firms with mixed ownership register a rate of
TABLE 1.—PERCENTAGE SHARE OF INDUSTRIAL FIRMS, EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT BY OWNERSHIP TYPE, FOR SELECTED YEARS
Czech Republic Russia
1992 1996 2000 1993 1996 2000
Firm shares
Foreign 3.5 12.6 30.7 1.8 3.5 5.6
Mixed 0.7 21.0 12.9 32.6 42.7 28.2
Private (domestic) 18.4 57.4 54.1 16.7 38.3 51.3
State 77.4 9.0 2.4 48.9 15.6 15.0
Shares of new firms
Foreign . . . 9.0 24.7 1.6 3.0 3.4
Mixed . . . 9.9 6.5 2.6 8.8 7.4
Private (domestic) . . . 42.9 43.7 1.8 7.7 17.2
State . . . 3.2 1.3 6.4 4.3 5.7
Employment shares
Foreign 2.6 12.1 33.7 0.7 1.9 11.5
Mixed 0.1 42.6 25.9 38.0 56.2 35.2
Private (domestic) 10.2 36.7 37.6 9.0 28.0 44.5
State 87.0 8.6 2.9 52.3 13.8 8.8
Output shares
Foreign 7.7 21.4 51.1 2.3 3.0 19.6
Mixed 0.1 40.8 22.3 45.5 68.6 33.3
Private (domestic) 7.6 30.6 24.9 6.8 19.5 41.7
State 84.6 7.2 1.7 45.4 8.9 5.4
Number of observations 1,537 2,283 2,084 17,923 17,138 15,035
In the Czech Republic, the ownership category is based on majority ownership, while in Russia, it is based on 100% ownership, except for foreign ownership, which can be partial. The sample consists of firms with
nonmissing values for industry, ownership, output, fixed assets, and employment. New firms are those that did not exist in 1992.
9 In these three subperiods, market institutions increasingly take hold
and different shocks occur. In Russia, problems such as the overvalued
ruble, lack of enterprise restructuring, and nonpayment of liabilities
diminished by 1998, but the country experienced a financial crisis in
August of that year. (Interestingly, the effects of this crisis were relatively
short as the value of the ruble stabilized and GDP growth resumed within
two quarters.) The 1998–2000 period in Russia is hence already one of
relatively mature transition. In the Czech Republic, mass privatization,
price liberalization, and macrostabilization were completed by 1995. A
recession set in 1996–1997, but the 1998–2000 period was one of
renewed economic growth and mature reforms as the country was prepar-
ing for entry into EU.
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increase that falls between that in foreign-owned firms and
SOEs or does not differ from that in SOEs. In Russia, all
four types of firms experienced a U-shaped profile in effi-
ciency change. In some estimation methods, nonstate-owned
firms experience a deeper (more convex) U-shaped profile,
with foreign firms’ efficiency falling faster, reaching an ear-
lier turning point, and rising faster thereafter than all other
types of firms. In examining how firms alter efficiency after
changing ownership, we find that foreign owners substan-
tially improved efficiency relative to the SOEs, while firms
with mixed and private ownership did somewhat better or
not significantly better than the SOEs. Our results are similar
to those of Brown et al. (2006) in the finding that foreign
ownership improves performance, while domestic owner-
ship improves it in CEE but worsens it in CIS. We differ
from Brown et al. (2006), however, in that we find that the
effect of privatizing to foreign owners is much larger in Rus-
sia than in the Czech Republic, while Brown et al. (2006) do
not find these effects to be different across countries. More-
over, we show that estimates based on the three types of IVs
yield larger coefficient estimates that those based on FE (and
by implication also FE&FT) used in Brown et al. (2006).
In examining the relative performance of the firms with
different types of ownership at various points of the distri-
bution of efficiency, we find that (a) foreign firms are con-
siderably more efficient than all three types of domestic
firms at most levels of the distribution, (b) the gap between
the efficiency of the foreign firms and all three types of
domestic firms is greatest at the top of the efficiency distri-
bution, and (c) compared to the Czech Republic, the effi-
ciency gap between the foreign and domestic firms in Rus-
sia is much larger throughout most of the distribution and
increases more rapidly from the worst to the best firms.
Overall, the average gap between the foreign and domesti-
cally owned firms is not only not closing; it is increasing over
time. The results suggest that privatization to domestic own-
ers did not have a major efficiency-enhancing effect during
the first postprivatization decade. Moreover, the estimates
for the three subperiods show that the three types of domestic
firms are not catching up to the world standard given by the
efficiency of the foreign-owned firms. These results are but-
tressed by our estimates of conditional (b) convergence,
which show that in both countries, foreign-owned firms con-
verge to a higher steady-state level of efficiency than the
three types of domestic firms and that in Russia, the foreign
firms are also converging faster than the domestic ones.
Are our findings driven by differences in the starting
positions of foreign and domestic firms or by differences
in the rates at which they raise efficiency over time? We
find that existing foreign firms are more efficient than for-
eign start-ups, a finding consistent with the fact that foreign
firms improve their efficiency with experience (over time).
Some estimates also suggest that foreign start-ups are more
efficient than domestic start-ups, but others suggest that this
is not the case. Domestically owned start-ups appear to be
more than or equally as efficient as existing domestic firms
in the Czech Republic, but they are less than or equally as
efficient as existing domestic firms in Russia. Finally, we
demonstrate that foreign firms tend to acquire somewhat
more efficient domestic firms rather than acquiring less effi-
cient firms and turning them around.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we pre-
sent our estimation strategy, data, and findings on the evolu-
tion of efficiency by ownership. In section III, we examine
the key factors that may explain the patterns found in sec-
tion II. We draw conclusions in section IV.
II. Evolution of Efficiency by Ownership
In this section, we establish the key stylized facts by esti-
mating the differences in efficiency across ownership types
and examining how these differences have changed over
time at the mean and at various points in the ownership-
specific efficiency distributions.
As we show in table A1 of the online appendix, we use
industrial firms with 100 or more employees in at least one
year covered by our study. (All tables with ‘‘A’’ in front num-
ber are in the online appendix.) We restrict the firm size
because the data on smaller firms are not fully representa-
tive.10 Our estimates are based on data for 1,537 to 2,970
firms a year in the Czech Republic and 15,035 to 19,209 firms
a year in Russia. In the Czech Republic, employment in these
firms covers between 86% and 100% of total employment in
firms with more than 100 employees. The Russian sample
represents between 70% and 94% of total employment out-
side the legally defined small firms.
We have carefully examined the data, removed inconsis-
tencies in variable definitions and measurement units, and
standardized as much as possible the classification of indus-
try and ownership across the two countries. For example,
we made the industry categories comparable between the
two countries by recoding the five-digit OKONKh Russian
Classification of Industries and the two-digit NACE Czech
Industry Classification into two-digit ISIC codes. (The defi-
nitions of the variables are provided in table A2 and dis-
cussed further below.) We have also improved the panel
nature of the data by using information from previous years
and other registries to find firms that changed their identifi-
cation number. In particular, in the early 1990s, firms that
changed their legal status could also change their identifica-
tion number. We matched these firms to their parent firms
by using the previous year’s information on name, address,
and values of variables.
A. Average Efficiency Gaps for 1992–2000
Our principal results are derived from an overall translog
revenue function, which in our data statistically dominates
more restrictive functional forms:
10 We carried out baseline estimations on data including the smaller
firms, and the estimates were not materially different.
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ln yit ¼ b0 þ Rkbk ln xikt þ
1
2
RkRlckl ln xikt ln xilt
þ qZit þ dIit þ 1Tt þ vi þ eit; ð1Þ
where yit represents the revenue of firm i in period t, xikt is a
vector of k inputs, Zit is a vector of ownership categories, Is
and Ts denote sets of dummy variables for industries and
years, respectively, vi are unobserved time-invariant firm-
specific effects, and eit is an independently distributed error
term.11 The baseline specification allows efficiency to vary
across types of ownership, industries, and time.
We use revenue as our main dependent variable in order
to capture the change in firm performance in a number of
dimensions, including improved productive efficiency and
ability to charge higher prices on account of marketing and
improved product and brand development, differences in
intangible assets, and the cost of capital, location in more or
less competitive industries, efficiency of vertical integration,
and the extent of outsourcing. In order to control for time-
varying differences in revenue across industries, we deflate
each firm’s revenue by a two-digit industry-specific producer
price index. This allows us to focus on how efficiently firms
generate sales revenue, taking into account inputs and indus-
try-level price. This is equivalent to total factor productivity
but broader in that it also captures improvements in pricing
within industry and the other aspects of revenue generation.
Note that our approach is in fact identical to most productiv-
ity analyses using firm-level data since very few of these stu-
dies have firm-level prices. We emphasize that this tradi-
tional approach to measuring performance allows for the
efficiency of different types of firms to vary on account of
any of these factors.
In most of our analysis, we use two inputs: capital and
labor. For capital, we use the average nominal value of fixed
assets for a given year, with annual time dummy variables
serving as a capital goods deflator. The labor variable is the
average number of full-time equivalent workers. Ideally, we
would like to include material inputs as a regressor, but we
do not have information on this variable for the entire 1992–
2000 period in Russia. However, we report robustness
checks of our ownership effects for the entire Czech and
smaller Russian data set in which material inputs are in-
cluded in estimation.
We use four categories of firm ownership: private
(domestically owned), state, mixed, and foreign. In Russia,
the categories are based on 100% ownership, except for for-
eign ownership, where firms with any foreign ownership are
classified as foreign. In the Czech Republic, ownership cate-
gories, including foreign, are based on majority ownership.
Hence, in the Czech Republic, the category of mixed owner-
ship includes firms in which no single type of owners has
more than a 50% stake, while in Russia, the mixed category
includes firms with no foreign ownership and no single type
of domestic owner with 100% ownership. Mixed ownership
in Russia therefore includes firms with much more concen-
trated ownership than in the Czech Republic. Moreover, in
the Czech Republic, firms classified as foreign are majority
foreign owned, while in Russia, they may have only a small
foreign ownership stake. Finally, unlike in Russia, in the
Czech Republic, firms with mixed ownership may (and
often do) have minority ownership by foreign investors. In
order to enhance cross-country comparability, we collected
additional data for Russia on ownership categories that are
comparable to those in the Czech Republic.12
As may be seen from table 1, whether measured by the
number of firms, share of employment, or share of output,
both countries display a pattern of declining state and rising
private ownership during the 1990s. However, the share of
firms with foreign ownership is much smaller in Russia
despite the more inclusive definition of this category. For
example, in 2000, the Russian share of foreign firms is about
one-fifth of the share in the Czech Republic. In both countries
the average foreign firm is larger in terms of both employ-
ment and output than the average domestic firm. Note, how-
ever, that in the mid-1990s, foreign firms in Russia included
relatively small firms, so that the foreign share in the number
of firms exceeded the foreign share in employment and out-
put. When we measure foreign ownership in a comparable
way to the Czech Republic, we find in table A6, that the share
of majority foreign-owned firms in Russia is on average only
1.13% (much less than the share reported in table 1).
In examining the share of new firms in table 1, we
observe that new private firms played a strong part from
early on in the Czech Republic and increasingly so in Rus-
sia. In particular, firms established after 1992 constitute the
vast majority of foreign firms in each country and also the
vast majority of domestically owned private firms in the
Czech Republic. Among the domestically owned firms in
Russia, the new firms constitute less than one-quarter in
1996 but over one-third in 2000.
Endogeneity issues. In any estimation, endogeneity of
regressors is an important issue. The complication in ana-
lyses of privatization is that the common problem of input
endogeneity is entwined with the potential correlation
between ownership types and the unobserved firm-specific
efficiency. Rewrite equation (1) in a vector form as
ln yit ¼ Xitbþ Zitqþ vi þ eit; ð2Þ
where X is a vector of inputs and dummy variables for
industry and years, Z is a vector of categories of ownership,
and E(vi) ¼ E(eit) ¼ E(vieit) ¼ E(eiteis) ¼ 0 for V t > s.
Unobserved firm-specific productivity could determine the
ownership type by influencing the governments’ decisions
11 As we discuss in table A2, we also include several dummy variables
to control for potential outliers and major events.
12 In particular, this data set covers the same firms, but for 10.3% of for-
eign firms, we do not have data on the exact share of foreign ownership
and hence assign them into a separate (unknown) ownership category dur-
ing estimation.
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to privatize or investors’ decisions to acquire the firm.
Moreover, potential new owners may respond to past pro-
ductivity shocks. Thus, ownership enters equation (2) as a
predetermined variable that may be correlated with past
shocks (eis) and with firm-specific unobservables (vi) but
not with present errors E(Ziteis) = 0 for V t> s, E(Zitvi) =
0, and E(Ziteit)¼ 0.
Under these conditions, the OLS and random effects (RE)
estimators may be biased and inconsistent. The fixed effects
(FE) and first difference (FD) estimators allow for the corre-
lation of Zit with vi but aggravate the measurement error by
increasing the noise-to-signal ratio (Griliches & Hausman,
1986), thus often leading to insignificant estimates of owner-
ship effects.13 In addition, the first differencing equation
makes ownership endogenous as E(Zitei-1) = 0 leads to
E(ZitZit1, eiteit1) = 0. We therefore do not generate
FD estimates and treat the FE estimates with caution.
To address the endogeneity of inputs, several treatment
methods have been proposed, including the Blundell-Bond
(2000) system GMM estimator, (henceforth BB), the Olley-
Pakes (1996) investment proxy estimator, and the Levin-
sohn-Petrin (2003) intermediate input proxy estimator (hen-
ceforth LP). Of these, we use the BB and LP methods.
There are no similar methods to treat the problem of
endogeneity in ownership. Interestingly, largely because of
the lack of valid instruments for ownership, the most com-
mon practice in the privatization literature has been to use
OLS, RE, or FE estimators.14 We use three IV approaches
and the WM method to address the issue of potential endo-
geneity of ownership.
Our first IV approach exploits the fact that we have infor-
mation on the firms’ supervisory ministries under central
planning. These ministries were in charge of specific SOEs
for many years (decades). With the regime change in the
early 1990s, the ministries lost control over the firms in
their jurisdiction and were no longer informed about their
performance. In particular, they were no longer able to give
binding orders, transfer resources, and obtain detailed infor-
mation about the performance of the firms in the rapidly
changing environment.15 Yet the individual ministries were
key in determining the timing, extent, and nature of privati-
zation during the 1990s. In Russia there were over 100
independent ministries (aggregated to 37 in our data) oper-
ating at the federal, regional, and municipal levels of gov-
ernment. Given their independence and different regional
jurisdictions, their privatization decisions were quite idio-
syncratic; the federal ones, for example, were more likely
to be motivated by maximizing the revenues from privatiza-
tion and the local ones by generating employment.
In our first IV estimator, we use ministry categories (along
with year dummies) to estimate a binary (probit) ownership
model for each ownership type and then apply the fitted own-
ership probabilities from the probit as instruments for actual
ownership categories; the model is hence exactly identi-
fied.16 The chi-squared-test values of the ministry dummy
variables in the first stage equation (reported in table 2) indi-
cate that they are very good predictors of the ownership cate-
gories. The predicted probabilities have useful properties as
instruments for binary endogenous variables: the IV estima-
tor is asymptotically efficient, the fitted probabilities stay
within the [0,1] range, and the first-stage equation need not
be correctly specified (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002). Since new
firms do not have a supervisory ministry from the communist
era, we assign them a separate dummy variable that reflects
the common licensing and other conditions that they have to
fulfill to start a business. At a more informal level, we also
check that ministries that would be expected to be associated
with particular types of ownership changes indeed are more
likely to be associated with them than others. For example,
we find that shifts from state to foreign ownership are more
likely to be observed in ministries dealing with firms (e.g.,
ministries of industries) than those dealing with strategic
institutions (e.g., ministries of foreign affairs or interior).
While idiosyncratic ministries that lost control over firms
but approved privatization projects are appealing instru-
ments, one might wonder if firms of each ownership type
under different ministries were not systematically different,
thus inducing correlation between ministry dummies and
the error term. As a result, we also use an IV procedure in
which we instrument ownership with time-varying regional
data on the outcome of regional elections and the rate of
unemployment. The arguments for using these two variables
as IVs are that (a) regional leaders from right-of-center
(reform-oriented) parties are more likely to privatize and
attract new private firms (domestic and foreign) than leaders
elected from the left-of-center (communist-type) parties,
and (b) in regions where unemployment is higher, there will
be more resistance to privatization and lower probability of
entry of new private firms.17 For both countries, we have
13 The measurement error problem is especially severe for variables
with little variation over time. Since we have a significant number of
firms for which we do not observe ownership changes (65.6% of firms in
the Czech Republic and 46.1% in Russia) and only a few firms where we
observe ownership changing more than once between during 1992 and
2000 (8.5% in the Czech Republic and 13.4% in Russia), it is preferable
not to rely on the FE or FD estimates. With limited observed changes in
ownership, a small amount of measurement error in ownership classifica-
tion may create a high noise-to-signal ratio. RE estimates use within and
cross-sectional information and are hence less affected by this problem.
14 See Hanousek et al. (2007) for an exception.
15 The correlations between industry dummies in the Xit vector of
regressors and the ministry dummies identifying the effect of ownership
variables are low. In Russia, for instance, firms in the same industry
reported to different ministries at the federal, regional, and municipal
levels.
16 Besides fitted ownership probabilities, the first stage includes all the
second-stage variables. To preserve space, the full first stage results are re-
ported in the online data appendix.
17 See Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar (2008) for a political economy model
that high-unemployment-regions-delayed privatization. Jurajda and Ter-
rell (2009) provide empirical evidence for four transition economies (Bul-
garia, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Ukraine) that foreign direct invest-
ment is more likely to flow to regions with high human capital and low
unemployment than to regions with low human capital and high unem-
ployment.
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collected data on the outcomes of regional elections and on
regional unemployment rate (7 regions in the Czech Repub-
lic and 89 regions in Russia). For the Czech Republic, we
also use the municipal share of seats in the Czech parliament
and the percentage of seats held by communist-type parties
for each municipality. In Russia, political variables include
four dummy variables indicating whether the current regio-
nal governor is a former regional administrator with no party
affiliation or whether he or she represents the communist-
type parties, reform-oriented parties, or other parties. In both
countries, the chi-squared-test values for the unemployment
rate and political variables in the first-stage equation are
high and statistically significant (see table 2 and tables A8–
A11 for complete first-stage results).
Of course, while the unemployment rate and political
variables are in many respects appealing as IVs, one might
imagine scenarios where they are correlated with the error
terms in the main regression in other ways than only by
ownership. A right-leaning government might, for instance,
implement policies that affect the productivity of firms and
not just do so by increasing the likelihood of privatization.
High unemployment might influence local economic condi-
tions in ways other than by influencing privatization prob-
abilities. Both variables could also in principle be affected
by the productivity of local firms. In view of the fact that
one could imagine situations where the industry IVs (super-
vising ministries) and the regional IVs (unemployment and
political variables) are correlated with the error term, we
have also used the interaction between the supervising min-
istries and the regional characteristics (unemployment and
political variables) as a third set of IVs. For these IVs, it is
much harder to think of stories that would imply correlation
between them and the error term in the main regression.
Finally, in addition to using the three IV approaches, we
also employ the matching and impact evaluation methods
pioneered by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). In our context,
we consider private firms (domestic, foreign, and mixed) as
a treatment group and state ownership as the control group.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that if treatment is
randomized conditionally on the observed covariates, then
it is randomized conditional on the (scalar) propensity score
(i.e., the conditional probability of treatment given the ob-
served covariates). A large econometric literature has sub-
sequently developed various matching techniques.18 Based
on recent work by Busso (2008), we use a weighted match-
ing (WM) technique. In this approach, state-owned firms at
time t that have similar characteristics as firms that are pri-
vate (domestic, foreign, or mixed) at time t are given more
weight in the estimation as they are seen to be a better
match or control group. Specifically, we estimate the condi-
tional probability of being in a control group, p̂ Xitð Þ, for
each firm in each year using a multinomial logit model
(where 0 ¼ state owned, 1 ¼ foreign private, 2 ¼ domestic
private, and 3 ¼ mixed) with observed firm characteristics
such as firm size (log of inputs), industry, ministry, party in
power in the region, and regional unemployment rate. We
follow the standard empirical approach of trimming obser-
TABLE 2.—AVERAGE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP ON EFFICIENCY, 1992–2000
OLS FE RE IV1-RE IV2-RE IV3-RE WM
Czech Republic
Foreign 0.420*** 0.270*** 0.309*** 0.349*** 0.346*** 0.349*** 0.146***
(0.032) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.042)
Mixed 0.111*** 0.086*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.100*** 0.013
(0.030) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
Private 0.133*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.033
(0.024) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.032)
Number of observations 19,945 19,945 19,945 15,646 15,507 15,507 14,243
Number of firms 4,654 4,654 4,654 3,869 3,780 3,780 3,853
R2 (overall) 0.765 0.662 0.752 0.756 0.757 0.757 0.501
First-stage significance
of instruments
. . . . . . . . . v2 ¼ 376** v2 ¼ 16** v2 ¼ 153** . . .
Russia
Foreign 1.023*** 0.163*** 0.433*** 0.663*** 0.675*** 0.652*** 0.218***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.040)
Mixed 0.157*** 0.049*** 0.004 0.080*** 0.067*** 0.060*** 0.029***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.010)
Private 0.190*** 0.061*** 0.003 0.084*** 0.068*** 0.056*** 0.035*
(0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
Number of observations 152,887 152,887 152,887 140,219 139,891 139,891 134,384
Number of firms 26,188 26,188 26,188 24,510 24,412 24,412 25,411
R2 (overall) 0.723 0.633 0.714 0.727 0.727 0.743 0.525
First-stage significance
of instruments
. . . . . . . . . v2¼1,798** v2¼615** v2¼1,658** . . .
The dependent variable is log of revenue. Coefficients are estimated effects of different types of ownership relative to state ownership. To account for arbitrary serial correlation, we report (Arellano, 1987) firm-
clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant at **5%; ***1%. The estimates are obtained from the translog production function specified in equation (1) and include industry dummies, year dummies, and con-
trols for data anomalies. RE: random effects estimator; FE: fixed effects estimator; IV1 uses ministries under central planning as instruments; IV2 uses regional political influence and unemployment rate as instru-
ments, WM: weighted matching estimator with propensity scores used as weights (described in the text). The v2 test for the statistical significance of instruments in the first-stage (probit) is reported for private versus
other. Other types of ownership produce similar results, which are not reported. WM estimates are for 1993–2000.
18 For example, pair matching shares, nearest-neighbor matching, and
kernel matching.
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vations with extreme values of the propensity score outside
the interval [0.01, 0.99] (Crump et al., 2008). We compute
xit ¼ 1=p̂it for each observation in the control group and
xit ¼ 1= 1 p̂itð Þ for each observation in the treatment
group and then apply the propensity score weights to the
estimating revenue equation with firm fixed effects and
firm-clustered standard errors.19
Overall, we note that our use of the three sets of IVs and
the WM approach represents a step in the right direction,
given that we use entire populations of medium and large
industrial firms and most other studies in this area have not
used the IV or WM approach. Moreover, while future stu-
dies may use randomized experiments and hence be even
better identified, they are likely to suffer from the problem
of having small samples with limited external validity. As
usual, readers should make their judgments on the basis of
the full evidence presented in this and other papers.
Basic findings for average gaps. The estimates of aver-
age efficiency effects by ownership for the Czech Republic
and Russia from 1992 to 2000 are reported in table 2.20 The
ownership coefficients are for private, mixed, and foreign
firms relative to the SOEs, which serve as the base. Robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in par-
entheses.21 In order to assess the robustness of our baseline
model estimates, we report coefficients from seven estima-
tors: pooled OLS, random effect (RE) estimator, FE estima-
tor, RE estimator with ministries as IVs (IV1-RE), RE
estimator with regional political variables and the unemploy-
ment rate as IVs (IV2-RE), RE estimator with the interaction
of ministries and regional variables (political variables and
the unemployment rate) as IVs (IV3-RE), and the WM esti-
mator described above. All seven methods yield a broadly
similar pattern of results.
First, firms with foreign ownership are found to be signif-
icantly more efficient than the SOEs, with the differential in
all but the FE estimate being greater in Russia than in the
Czech Republic. The true efficiency differences are likely
to be below the biased OLS estimates and above the FE
estimates, which are most affected by the measurement
error–driven attenuation bias. Since the WM method uses
firm fixed effects, the WM estimates are close to FE esti-
mates (0.15 in the Czech Republic and 0.22 in Russia), yet
they are preferred over OLS because of the more balanced
definitions of control and treatment groups along observa-
ble dimensions. We consider the WM estimated as our
lower bound for the true efficiency differences due to the
potential attenuation bias. For the endogeneity reasons out-
lined above, we also prefer the IV-RE estimates that yield
an average foreign-SOE efficiency premium for the 1992–
2000 period of approximately 35% in the Czech Republic
and 65% to 67% in Russia. The lower (WM) estimates for
Russia are relatively close to those obtained by Brown et al.
(2006), whereas the IV-RE estimates are higher.
Second, firms with foreign ownership are on average
much more efficient than both domestic private firms and
firms with mixed ownership. The differences in coefficients
are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Third, within each country, firms with private and mixed
ownership generate similar efficiency coefficients in most
estimates. In the Czech Republic, these two types of firms
are in most estimates found to be 7% to 13% more efficient
than the SOEs, except for the insignificant WM estimates.
In Russia, the OLS estimates suggest that the mixed and
private firms are 16% to 19% more efficient than the SOEs,
the RE estimates suggest that they are indistinguishable
from the SOEs, and the FE, WM, and three IV-RE esti-
mates show the mixed and private firms to be 3% to 8% less
efficient than the SOEs.
Robustness checks. In addition to presenting estimates
derived from several methods, we perform a number of
robustness tests reported in tables A3 to A6. First, we test
whether ownership effects are sensitive to the use of a trans-
log production function and reestimate the effects with a
Cobb-Douglas specification. The OLS results presented in
the first two columns of table A3 indicate that the differ-
ences in the ownership effects across these two specifica-
tions are small (although statistically significant with the p-
values for the v2 test being 0.00). Since the F-tests in table
A3 indicate that the translog specification is preferred, we
continue with this specification.
Second, we test for sensitivity of the coefficients on own-
ership to restricting the coefficients on inputs to be the same
in all industries. In column 3 of table A3, we report the esti-
mates from a regression that allows the coefficients on
inputs to vary by industry (at the two-digit ISIC level) in
the OLS translog specification. The v2 test indicates that
this change in specification does not alter the estimated
ownership effects in the Czech Republic (the p-value is
0.68) but reduces them somewhat in Russia (the p-value is
0.00).
Third, the data for Russia (but not the Czech Republic)
permit us to check the sensitivity of our findings to different
levels of aggregation of industry in the coding of the indus-
try dummy variables. We find that the estimated coeffi-
cients on ownership from a specification, including four-
digit ISIC dummies to control for heterogeneity across
industries, are similar to those obtained when using two-
digit ISIC dummies.22 Hence, controlling for heterogeneity
19 The WM estimates are based on 1993–2000 data in order to have a
sufficient number of foreign-owned firms for matching.
20 The complete sets of translog coefficients are available on request.
21 Note from table 1 that the number of SOEs decreases over time but
remains sufficiently large for SOE to be usable as the base. This permits
us to avoid switching the base over time and forcing readers to reinterpret
the results accordingly. Using the SOEs as a base is also appealing con-
ceptually since state ownership constitutes the original category from
which most firms evolved and to which one naturally wants to compare
the alternatives. 22 The results are available from authors on request.
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at the two- versus four-digit ISIC level does not appear to
affect our findings.
Fourth, we test whether the relatively high efficiency of
foreign-owned firms is being driven by industries where
there is a higher share of foreign firms or less competition.
As we show in the last two columns of table A3, this is not
the case. When we include the interaction of the ownership
variables with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), the
OLS coefficients on foreign ownership decline slightly but
remain large and significant in both countries. The same
result is obtained when we add the interaction of ownership
variables with the output share of foreign firms in the given
industry.23
Fifth, we test whether the results are sensitive to the
exclusion of material inputs and the use of revenue rather
than value added as the dependent variable. We reestimate
equation (1) with the Czech data for the entire 1992–2000
period and with a large subset of Russian firms for the
1996–2000 period using value added as the dependent vari-
able, where value added is defined as sales revenues minus
the cost of material inputs. Table A4 shows that in the
Czech Republic, there is little change in the estimated coef-
ficients on ownership in all specifications, with the excep-
tion of the RE and FE estimates for mixed firms, which are
insignificant. Because the data on material inputs are avail-
able in Russia for a smaller number of firms (about 12,000
firms per year) and fewer years, for comparability purposes
in table A4, we report for these firms estimates based on
both revenue and value added. Both specifications yield
broadly similar estimated coefficients of ownership. Thus,
we conclude that our results are not very sensitive to omit-
ting material inputs and to the use of revenue as the depen-
dent variable.
Sixth, with the entire data set for the Czech Republic
and a large subset of the Russian data, we are able to check
whether using the LP method to control for endogeneity of
inputs changes our results. In the last column of table A4
we report the LP estimates based on value added for the
Czech Republic and the LP estimates based on value added
and revenue for Russia. Given the design of table A4, the
Czech LP results based on revenue cannot be easily
reported in tabular form and hence we report the coefficient
estimates and associated standard errors here: 0.117
(0.011) for foreign, 0.001 (0.014) for mixed, and 0.033
(0.010) for private ownership. These estimates, together
with those reported in table A4, indicate that in both coun-
tries, the LP estimates are broadly similar to those gener-
ated by the other methods. The LP estimates based on rev-
enue are similar to the WM estimates in the Czech
Republic and come close to the RE estimates in Russia
(although the coefficients, on mixed and private ownership
are statistically significant). The LP estimates based on
value added are similar to the FE, RE, and IV-RE estimates
in the Czech Republic and the RE estimates in Russia
(though the coefficient on private ownership is positive and
significant).24
Seventh, we also generate estimates using the Blundell-
Bond system GMM estimator. We use the first four lags of
levels and differences in inputs and ownership as instru-
ments for differences and levels, respectively. In addition,
we use either ministries (BB-IV1) or political variables and
unemployment (BB-IV2) as instruments. Table A5 shows
that within each country, the two sets of instruments yield
very similar results, suggesting that the efficiency effect of
foreign ownership is the greatest, followed by mixed and
private ownership, relative to the SOEs. In both the Czech
Republic and Russia, the BB estimates resemble most the
OLS results reported in table 2.
Eighth, we test the extent to which the differences in own-
ership effects in the two countries arise from different defini-
tions of what constitutes a foreign-owned firm. In table A6,
panel A, we present the results for Russia, with three sepa-
rate categories of foreign ownership indicating whether for-
eign investors have a majority, minority, or unknown share
of ownership.25 The results show that majority foreign own-
ership has a much higher effect on firm efficiency than min-
ority foreign ownership. Moreover, in all estimations, the
estimated coefficients on mixed ownership are much smaller
than those on minority foreign ownership. Combining them
to approximate the category of mixed ownership as it is
defined in the Czech data yields a foreign-mixed differential
that is much larger than that in the Czech Republic. Thus,
using a more similar definition of different types of owner-
ship in the two countries suggests that the effect of foreign
ownership is much larger in Russia, relative to the Czech
Republic, than was discernible from the different definitions
used for the overall sample in table 2.26
Finally, to the extent that small firms behave differently
from large firms, the unweighted regressions in table 2 give
excessive importance to small companies. For instance,
large foreign firms could more likely be subsidiaries of mul-
tinationals and as a result be more efficient than small for-
eign firms. We have therefore reestimated the regressions in
table 2 with all observations weighted by employment. The
coefficients are similar to but smaller than those in table 2.
Overall, the weighted regression results suggest that the dif-
ferentials in efficiency exist for firms of all sizes but are
greater among the smaller firms.27
23 For detail on the values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the
output share of foreign firms in each industry, see tables A3 and A4 in
Sabirianova, Svejnar, and Terrell (2005a).
24 Interestingly, the LP estimates based on value-added generate higher
effects of foreign ownership than those based on revenue.
25 Because of too many categories of ownership to be instrumented, we
do not use IV methods in this particular case. We do not know the share
of foreign investors in 35% of all foreign firms.
26 Panel B of table A6 also shows that the effect of the majority foreign
ownership relative to other categories is much larger in Russia than that
in the Czech Republic.
27 Results are available from authors on request.
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B. Changes in the Efficiency Gaps over Time
We next ask to what extent the average gap between the
foreign and domestically owned firms is closing over time:
Are domestic firms catching up to the world standard? This
of course depends on how quickly domestic and foreign
firms improve their efficiency. In general, foreign firms start
their operations in emerging markets with limited local
knowledge, and their efficiency rises over time as they
acquire this knowledge. Domestic firms in turn enter the
transition with a lack of knowledge, of the market economy,
as well as a lack of Western managerial and technical know-
how, and their efficiency should increase as they acquire
this knowledge. The question is whether foreign and domes-
tic firms improve their efficiencies at a different rate over
time.
In order to answer this question, we first augment the
basic specification by interacting the ownership dummy
variables with a linear and quadratic time trend. This
approach examines the evolution of efficiency of firms with
different types of ownership regardless of how long a firm
has been in a given type of ownership. The results with a
linear trend, reported in table 3, suggest that the average
gap between the foreign and domestically owned firms is
increasing over time in both countries. In our preferred (IV
and WM) specifications, the foreign-owned firms experi-
ence a faster annual rate of increase in efficiency than SOEs
by 4.4 to 5.5 percentage points in the Czech Republic and
4.2 to 6.7 percentage points in Russia. It is interesting that
in the Czech Republic, the efficiency of the SOEs and pri-
vate domestic firms is increasing at about 2.1% to 4.1%
annually, while in Russia, it is trending downward by 1.9%
to 2.6% a year.
We also estimate the quadratic specification. The results
for the Czech Republic are not reported because the linear
specification statistically dominates the quadratic one. In
Russia, the quadratic specification is statistically superior
and thus reported. Table 3 indicates that all four types of
firms in Russia display a U-shaped trend in efficiency. The
FE, RE, IV3-RE, and WM estimates suggest that nonstate-
owned firms experience a deeper (more convex) U-shaped
trend, with foreign firms’ efficiency falling faster, reaching
an earlier turning point, and rising faster thereafter than all
other types of firms.28
While the average foreign-domestic efficiency gap is ris-
ing over the sample period in both countries, we do find
important differences in the evolution of the gap depending
on the position of the firm in the efficiency distribution. We
estimate the revenue function separately for the early, mid-,
and late transition periods of 1992–1994, 1995–1997, and
1998–2000, allowing the efficiency of firms with different
types of ownership to change over the three periods, and we
compare domestic and foreign firms at corresponding per-
centiles of their respective efficiency distributions in differ-
ent time periods. We carry out two estimations comparing
firms with different types of ownership at various points
of the efficiency distribution. First, we estimate a series of
quantile regressions of the form
Qh ln yitjXit; Zit½  ¼ Xitbh þ Zitqh; ð3Þ
where Qh is the hth quantile of lnyit conditional on the cov-
ariates X and Z. The estimated coefficients qh give the rela-
tive efficiency of firms with different ownership at the hth
quantile. The quantile approach provides a flexible estima-
tion of all coefficients at different levels of efficiency. A
potential drawback of the quantile estimates is that they do
not control for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity. As a
result, we also use the panel estimates of equation (2), and
for each firm i, we calculate efficiency as ui ¼ qþ vi for
each ownership type, with E(ui) ¼ q and E(vi) ¼ 0. The
idiosyncratic errors (eit) are excluded from the measure of
firm-specific efficiency in order to reduce the effect of tran-
sitory productivity shocks and statistical noise.
The two approaches permit us to compare the efficiency
of firms with different types of ownership at all points of
the efficiency distribution, but they differ in their underly-
ing constraints: the panel framework allows productive effi-
ciency to vary across firms but constrains the production
function coefficients to be identical for all firms, while the
quantile approach constrains productive efficiency to be
the same for all firms in a given percentile of the distribu-
tion but permits the production function coefficients to vary
across percentiles. In our case, the quantile and panel esti-
mates yield very similar results. For brevity, we present the
quantile estimates in graphical form in figure 1, with the
corresponding point estimates for each subperiod and dif-
ferences across subperiods being reported in the table A7.
The results yield fouring insights.
First, foreign firms are considerably more efficient than
all three types of domestic firms at most levels of the distri-
bution of efficiency, from the best to (almost) the worst.29
At the same time, the differences in the distributions of effi-
ciency of the three types of domestic firms are relatively
small, with mixed and private firms being 0 to 25% more
28 We also augmented the basic specification by interacting the owner-
ship dummy variables with a linear and quadratic time trend measured as
the number of years that a firm has been in the current ownership category
since the regime change in 1991. As in the case of a calendar time trend,
the quadratic specification is statistically superior in Russia; however, in
the Czech regressions, the quadratic terms are all insignificant. The results
are broadly similar to ones reported in table 3.
29 We define the best (worst) firms as those in the upper (lower) decile
of the distribution of efficiency in their specific ownership type. Tests of
the difference in the coefficients between foreign and mixed and between
foreign and private are not shown to conserve space. They are signifi-
cantly different from 0 in all cases except the foreign-mixed efficiency
differential in the early transition (1992–1994) in the bottom decile in
Russia and most of the distribution in the Czech Republic, and also in the
bottom decile in the Czech Republic in mature transition (1998–2000). In
this context, it must be remembered that in the Czech Republic, firms with
mixed ownership include foreign firms with less than a 50% ownership
stake.
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efficient than state-owned firms at nearly every point of the
distribution and in each of the three periods.
Second, the gap between the efficiency of the foreign
firms and all three types of domestic firms is greatest among
the more efficient firms (90th percentile) and smallest
among the least efficient ones (10th percentile). An excep-
tion is the foreign-state efficiency gap in the Czech Repub-
lic during the 1998–2000 period when the relative effi-
ciency of the worst (remaining) Czech SOEs actually drops
and the foreign-state difference in efficiency becomes the
TABLE 3.—TIME-VARYING EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP ON EFFICIENCY, 1992–2000
FE RE IV1-RE IV2-RE IV3-RE WM
Czech Republic, Linear Trend
Foreign 0.138*** 0.203*** 0.110*** 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.020
(0.043) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.071)
Mixed 0.122*** 0.105*** 0.052 0.048 0.041 0.016
(0.032) (0.032) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (0.045)
Private 0.194*** 0.179*** 0.059** 0.057** 0.060*** 0.059
(0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.042)
Foreign  Time 0.004 0.004 0.054** 0.055** 0.053** 0.044**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013)
Mixed  Time 0.036*** 0.025*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Private  Time 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.016 0.017** 0.016** 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Time 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.041***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
R2 (overall) 0.663 0.751 0.754 0.754 0.755 0.502
Russia, Linear Trend
Foreign 0.161** 0.179*** 0.381*** 0.378*** 0.395*** 0.169**
(0.070) (0.060) (0.054) (0.056) (0.053) (0.075)
Mixed 0.012 0.021* 0.050 0.052 0.030 0.024**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.046) (0.050) (0.043) (0.012)
Private 0.022 0.002 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.085*** 0.021
(0.012) (0.011) (0.030) (0.033) (0.027) (0.015)
Foreign  Time 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.042*** 0.067***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013)
Mixed  Time 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.015 0.012 0.015*** 0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
Private  Time 0.032*** 0.019*** 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Time 0.003 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.026***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 (overall) 0.619 0.708 0.722 0.723 0.740 0.512
Russia, Quadratic Trend
Foreign 0.043 0.260*** 0.940*** 0.930*** 0.892*** 0.030
(0.082) (0.071) (0.108) (0.116) (0.155) (0.045)
Mixed 0.009 0.048*** 0.457*** 0.275 0.077 0.001
(0.010) (0.009) (0.113) (0.166) (0.268) (0.010)
Private 0.066*** 0.096*** 0.100 0.098 0.008 0.064***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.053) (0.061) (0.073) (0.013)
Foreign  Time 0.086*** 0.038 0.065 0.042 0.120** 0.065***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.058) (0.061) (0.066) (0.020)
Mixed  Time 0.060*** 0.045*** 0.146** 0.054 0.052 0.036***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.064) (0.088) (0.121) (0.006)
Private  Time 0.098*** 0.074*** 0.051 0.044 0.007 0.075***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.031) (0.033) (0.027) (0.007)
Foreign  Time2 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.003 0.001 0.017*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003)
Mixed  Time2 0.004** 0.003* 0.014 0.004 0.008 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.001)
Private  Time2 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Time 0.069*** 0.102*** 0.175*** 0.188*** 0.152*** 0.085***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.031) (0.040) (0.050) (0.005)
Time2 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001)
R2 (overall) 0.626 0.711 0.732 0.733 0.728 0.515
Significance of quadratic terms F ¼ 97.4*** F ¼ 546.4*** v2 ¼ 1027.7*** v2 ¼ 1264.2*** v2 ¼ 675.7*** v2 ¼ 233.3***
Number of observations and firms is the same as in table 2. The dependent variable is log of revenue. Coefficients are estimated log effects of different types of ownership relative to state ownership. We report
(Arellano 1987) firm-clustered standard errors to control for arbitrary serial correlation; Significant at **5%; ***1%. The estimates are obtained from the translog production function specified in equation (1) and
which includes industry dummies, year dummies, and controls for data anomalies. RE: random effects estimator; FE; fixed effects estimator; IV1 uses ministries under central planning as instruments; IV2 uses regio-
nal political influence and unemployment rate as instruments; WM: weighted matching estimator with propensity scores used as weights (described in the text). Time is time trend (1 in 1993). WM estimates are for
1993–2000.
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greatest in the bottom decile.30 The fact that these ineffi-
cient SOEs did not go out of business is consistent with the
finding of Lı́zal and Svejnar (2002) that bank lending for
investment pointed to important signs of soft budget con-
straints (bailouts) among the large and medium-size Czech
firms in the 1990s. The large efficiency differentials that we
find in Russia between firms with foreign ownership and all
other firms are likely also signs of the presence of soft bud-
get constraints.
Third, compared to the Czech Republic, the gap between
the foreign and domestic firms in Russia is much larger for
FIGURE 1.—QUANTILE ESTIMATES OF RELATIVE OWNERSHIP EFFECTS ON EFFICIENCY BY PERIOD
30 The fact that in mature transition, the remaining least efficient Czech
SOEs were considerably less efficient than the other types of firms sup-
ports the Gupta et al. (2008) models and empirical findings that better
firms were privatized first.
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most of the distribution and increases more rapidly from the
worst to the best firms. For example, in the first period in
Russia, the foreign-state efficiency gap ranges from 0.134
in the 10th decile to 1.040 in the 90th decile, while in the
Czech Republic, the corresponding differentials are 0.187
and 0.389.
Finally, In Russia, the efficiency gap between foreign
and domestic firms grows at virtually all points of the distri-
bution from early to midtransition, and the growth con-
tinues to be positive though smaller in mid- to late transi-
tion. In the Czech Republic, there is generally no significant
change in the foreign-domestic gap for mixed and private
firms over time, but the foreign-state gap grows, especially
at the bottom of the distribution in the presence of the soft
budgets of SOEs.
In sum, we have carried out several tests of whether
domestic firms approached the efficiency of foreign firms
during the first decade of the transition. Our findings sug-
gest that the answer is no in both countries, regardless of
whether we compare the central tendency or counterpart
firms at various parts of their respective efficiency distribu-
tions. The average results overstate the gap at the bottom of
the distribution and understate it at the top. The gap grows
in the first half of the transition in both countries but much
faster in Russia. Between the second and third period, the
gap continues to grow (but more slowly) in Russia in all
except the most efficient firms, while in the Czech Repub-
lic, it remains generally unchanged for all firms except the
SOEs, where the gap continues to grow, especially among
the least efficient. Foreign firms are also increasingly dis-
placing local firms in the top deciles of the efficiency distri-
bution.31
III. Factors Affecting Evolution of Efficiency Gap
Why is the efficiency gap between foreign and domestic
firms not closing over time, and why is it larger in Russia
than in the Czech Republic? With respect to the former, we
focus on whether the gap results from initial differences
between foreign and domestic firms or from differences in
the evolutions of their efficiency over time, or both. We
also check the extent to which the gap is due to better
domestic firms being acquired by foreign investors, which
we surmise is the case from our comparison of different
estimation methods in table 2.32 With respect to the ques-
tion on the relative size of the foreign-domestic gap across
the two countries, in an exploratory analysis not reported in
detail here, we suggest that differences in their institutional
and legal systems, rather than achieved level of economic
development or prevalence of Western business practices,
account for the larger gap observed in Russia than the
Czech Republic.33
A. Start-ups
We start with a nonparametric approach to compare the
efficiency levels of new firms by ownership type. We use
firm-specific estimates of efficiency calculated from stan-
dardized residuals of the translog function estimated sepa-
rately for each year during the 1992–2000 period.34 Based
on its individual efficiency measure, each start-up firm is
categorized by whether it enters in the bottom, middle, or
top third of the overall distribution of efficiency in each
year. In both countries, foreign start-ups turn out to have a
higher (0.5) probability of entering in the top third of the
distribution than any type of domestic start-up (whose
probability is 0.3). The only exception is in the Czech
Republic, where firms with mixed ownership, a category
that also contains firms with significant minority foreign
ownership, have a similarly high probability of entering
at the top third of the distribution.35
We also carry out two parametric tests. The first test con-
sists of augmenting equation (2) with interaction terms
between ownership dummy variables and a variable ‘‘start-
up,’’ with the latter coded 1 in the first year of a firm’s exis-
tence and 0 otherwise. The coefficients on these interaction
terms give the average efficiency of start-ups relative to
31 In Russia from 1992 to 1994, the few foreign firms (1.4% of all firms)
are disproportionately represented in the highest decile of the efficiency
distribution (4.6%). Over time, as the share of foreign firms in the econ-
omy rises to 3.3% and 4.9% over 1995–1997 and 1998–2000, respec-
tively, their share in the top decile of the efficiency distribution rises even
faster, to 14.3% and 21.8% in these respective time periods. In the Czech
Republic, one observes a more marked penetration of foreign-owned
firms and growing representation in the top decile of the efficiency distri-
bution. For example, in 1998–2000 foreign firms represent 25.3% of all
firms but 51.5% of firms in the top decile.
32 We do not pretend to examine all the potential factors that can affect
the relative efficiency of domestic and foreign firms. For example, we are
not testing for potential spillover effects of having foreign firms in the
same industries or regions.
33 We can go some way toward distinguishing whether the different
findings for Russia and the Czech Republic are brought about by differ-
ences in institutional or legal structures, the level of economic develop-
ment, or the Western market and business culture. In order to do so, we
focus on the Moscow and St. Petersburg regions of Russia. The Moscow
region resembles the Czech Republic in that it is economically much
more advanced (closer to the frontier) than the other Russian regions. The
St. Petersburg region resembles the Czech Republic in that it borders on a
Western market economy and, like the Czech Republic, is often viewed
to have more of a Western business culture. The Moscow and St. Peters-
burg regions could hence be expected to generate similar results to those
for the Czech Republic on account of the level of development and busi-
ness culture, respectively. Yet the two regions share with the rest of Rus-
sia the legal and institutional environment, as well as the more closed
nature of the Russian economy. To assess which effect dominates, we
estimate the various measures of efficiency reported in table 2 on data
from firms located in the Moscow and St. Petersburg regions and check
whether they resemble more those from the Czech Republic or Russia as
a whole. We find that the parameter estimates for both Moscow and St.
Petersburg are similar to those for Russia as a whole rather than those for
the Czech Republic. This suggests that policies and institutional environ-
ment rather than the level of development or geographic proximity to
Western business culture determine the relative performance of foreign
and domestic firms in the emerging market economies.
34 We standardize the residuals because there may be year-to-year var-
iation in the distribution of the residuals that reflects changes in inflation
or shocks to the economy, which need to be controlled for.
35 To conserve space, we have not included a table with all the probabil-
ities. More detailed results are available on request.
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existing firms in the same ownership category during the
1992–2000 period. The RE and WM estimates of these
coefficients are given in the first two columns of each panel
in table 4.36 These estimates show that in both countries,
the newly created foreign-owned firms are less efficient
than existing foreign-owned firms. Domestically owned
start-ups appear to be more than or equally as efficient as
existing domestic firms in the Czech Republic, but they are
less than or equally efficient as existing domestic firms in
Russia. By adding the coefficient on the interaction between
a given ownership dummy and start-up dummy to the corre-
sponding base ownership coefficient, we obtain the effi-
ciency of the start-up of that ownership category relative to
the average efficiency of an existing SOE. This then permits
us to compare the relative efficiency of various start-ups.
As may be seen from the tests at the bottom of table 4, the
RE Estimates suggest that foreign-owned start-ups are more
efficient than all types of domestic startups in Russia and
that they are more efficient than private and state-owned
start-ups in the Czech Republic. With the WM estimates,
one cannot reject the hypothesis that the efficiency of for-
eign-owned startups is the same as that of their domestic
counterparts.
Our second parametric test tackles the question of whether
the relative performance of foreign and domestic start-ups
changed over time. This test is based on a specification that
adds to the above one the interaction of the start-up with
ownership and trend (calendar time). The coefficients on this
Startup  Ownership  Time interaction indicate that in the
Czech Republic, the average efficiency of all types of start-
ups is constant and hence not rising relative to one another.
In Russia, we obtain the same results with the WM model,
while the RE estimates suggest that the efficiency of domes-
tic start-ups is rising (albeit from a relatively low level) and
that of foreign start-ups remains constant.
B. Selective Acquisitions by Foreign Firms
The various estimates in table 2 suggest that transitioning
to foreign ownership increases the efficiency of the
acquired firms. An interesting related question is whether
foreign investors acquire (‘‘cream’’) the more productive
domestic firms or acquire and ‘‘turn around’’ the less pro-
ductive ones. If they cream, then they reduce the average
efficiency of the remaining domestic firms by downgrading
their composition. If they acquire and turn around ineffi-
cient firms, the average efficiency of the remaining domes-
tic firms improves as a result of the less efficient ones being
privatized to foreign owners.
TABLE 4.—RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF START-UPS BY OWNERSHIP TYPE
Czech Republic Russia Czech Republic Russia
RE WM RE WM RE WM RE WM
Foreign 0.305*** 0.156*** 0.445*** 0.231*** 0.303*** 0.155*** 0.451** 0.230**
(0.023) (0.041) (0.031) (0.040) (0.024) (0.040) (0.031) (0.040)
Mixed 0.088*** 0.014 0.012 0.032*** 0.089*** 0.013 0.009 0.032**
(0.019) (0.029) (0.008) (0.010) (0.019) (0.028) (0.008) (0.010)
Private 0.092*** 0.032 0.009 0.033** 0.092*** 0.031 0.006 0.034**
(0.017) (0.032) (0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.031) (0.010) (0.014)
SFor(¼Startup  Foreign) 0.064** 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.267*** 0.108** 0.204** 0.181*** 0.205***
(0.028) (0.043) (0.047) (0.052) (0.043) (0.080) (0.063) (0.070)
SMix(¼Startup Mixed) 0.090** 0.030 0.015 0.061*** 0.107 0.106 0.079*** 0.076***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.016) (0.021) (0.082) (0.067) (0.023) (0.027)
SPri (¼Startup  Private) 0.041*** 0.017 0.029 0.040** 0.050*** 0.009 0.065*** 0.015
(0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028)
SSta(¼Startup  State) 0.026 0.041 0.165*** 0.142*** 0.022 0.009 0.172*** 0.142***
(0.022) (0.043) (0.013) (0.021) (0.023) (0.042) (0.014) (0.025)
SFor(¼Startup  Foreign) Time . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.021 0.023 0.007 0.037
(0.013) (0.026) (0.020) (0.024)
SMix(¼Startup Mixed)  Time . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.008 0.043*** 0.027*** 0.007
(0.023) (0.020) (0.008) (0.013)
SPri(¼Startup  Private)  Time . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.008 0.014 0.029*** 0.009
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008)
SSta(¼Startup  State)  Time . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.029 0.019 0.015** 0.000
(0.020) (0.037) (0.006) (0.010)
R2 (overall) 0.752 0.504 0.714 0.526 0.752 0.505 0.714 0.526
P-values:
Foreign þ SFor ¼ Private þ SPri 0.001 0.698 0.000 0.581 0.251 0.335 0.000 0.375
Foreign þ SFor ¼Mixed þ SMix 0.267 0.747 0.000 0.396 0.990 0.204 0.000 0.113
Foreign þ SFor ¼ 0 0.000 0.895 0.000 0.574 0.000 0.607 0.000 0.751
Private þ SPri ¼Mixed þ SMix 0.358 0.981 0.036 0.447 0.520 0.493 0.613 0.129
Private þ SPri ¼ 0 0.000 0.703 0.242 0.001 0.000 0.423 0.006 0.098
Mixed þ SMix ¼ 0 0.000 0.764 0.138 0.000 0.020 0.196 0.000 0.000
Number of observations and firms is the same as in table 2. The dependent variable is log of revenue. Coefficients are estimated log effects of different types of ownership relative to state ownership. We report
(Arellano, 1987) firm-clustered standard errors to control for arbitrary serial correlation; Significant at **5%; ***1%. The estimates are obtained from the translog production function specified in equation (1), which
includes industry dummies, year dummies, and controls for data anomalies. RE: random effects estimator; WM: weighted matching estimator with propensity scores used as weights (described in the text). Start-up ¼
1 if firm is a start-up at time t. WM estimates are for 1993–2000.
36 We do not carry out IV estimation because the specification would
require a large number of instrumental variables.
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To test these hypotheses, we estimate a probit model that
shows whether the efficiency of a domestic firms in year
t  1 affects the probability of the firm’s being acquired by
a foreign firm in year t.37 We control for the firm’s owner-
ship at t  1 and ownership interacted with calendar time,
the logarithm of the firm’s capital (to control for size), and
industry, year, and regional dummy variables.38 The mar-
ginal effects from the probit, reported in table 5, indicate
that in both countries, foreign investors tend to acquire the
more efficient domestic firms. The effect is larger in the
Czech Republic than in Russia, but its economic signifi-
cance is limited in both countries. A 1 standard deviation
increase in a domestic firm’s efficiency leads to an increase
in the mean annual probability of the firms being acquired
by a foreign firm from 2.1% to 2.9% in the Czech Republic
and from 0.4% to 0.5% in Russia. These results suggest that
foreign investors cream but that the part of foreign firms’
superior performance that can be explained by selective
acquisitions of local firms is limited.39 Our estimates reject
the competing hypothesis that foreign investors select less
efficient firms and turn them around.
A question that also arises is whether our findings of
superior performance of foreign firms might result from the
fact that foreign investors acquire firms in less competitive
industries where the efficiency difference would be the
product of monopoly rents. To examine this hypothesis, we
enter a one-year lagged, two-digit Herfindahl index as an
additional explanatory variable to the probit equation. As
may be seen from table 5, the marginal effect of the Herfin-
dahl index is negative in both countries and statistically sig-
nificant in the Czech Republic. Foreign firms hence tend to
acquire firms in more rather than less competitive industries
in the Czech Republic and the acquisitions are unrelated to
the competitiveness in the industry of acquisition in Russia.
The greater efficiency of foreign firms hence does not
appear to be attributable to acquisition-related monopoly
rents.
C. Efficiency Frontier and Convergence
An important question is whether firms that are closer to
the efficiency frontier are more likely to respond to market
forces by improving their efficiency than those further from
the frontier. We address this issue and also assess whether
domestic and foreign firms converge to the same or differ-
ent steady-state level of efficiency and at a similar or differ-
ent speed.
The hypothesis advanced by Aghion et al. (2005, 2008)
and Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2006) is that competition,
brought about by the introduction of the market system (in
our case, transition) or entry of new firms, encourages
learning and innovative behavior among incumbent firms
that are near the technological frontier but stifles learning
TABLE 5.—MARGINAL EFFECT OF DOMESTIC FIRM EFFICIENCY AND INDUSTRY COMPETITION ON THE PROBABILITY OF ACQUISITION BY FOREIGN INVESTORS, 1993–2000
Czech Republic Russia
dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX
Et-1 (Efficiency) 0.750*** 0.734*** 0.047*** 0.039***
(0.087) (0.096) (0.010) (0.009)
Mixedt-1 1.634 0.936 0.193*** 0.205***
(1.872) (1.794) (0.047) (0.069)
Privatet-1 2.030*** 1.512*** 0.114** 0.125
(0.509) (0.575) (0.052) (0.069)
Mixedt-1 Time 0.297 0.122 0.080*** 0.079***
(0.177) (0.211) (0.013) (0.017)
Privatet-1 Time 0.351*** 0.175 0.058*** 0.058***
(0.113) (0.138) (0.013) (0.018)
Time 0.606*** 0.335 0.004 0.008
(0.097) (0.125) (0.010) (0.006)
lnKt-1 0.548*** 0.537 0.085*** 0.014
(0.060) (0.068) (0.006) (0.026)
Herfindahl indext-1 – 0.049*** – 0.008
(0.009) (0.006)
Number of observations 14,424 122,182
Pseudo-R2 0.111 0.157 0.146 0.168
Unconditional probability (%) 2.121 0.407
The reported marginal effects (multiplied by 100) are obtained from probit estimates. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether a formerly domestic firm is acquired by foreign investors. Standard
errors (multiplied by 100) are in parentheses. Significant at **5%; ***1%. The omitted category is state ownership lagged one year. The firm-specific measure of efficiency (E) is obtained from the standardized resi-
duals of the translog function estimated for each year separately, with industry dummies and controls for data anomalies included. Time is calendar time, starting with 1 in 1993. Regional dummies (for Russia) and
industry dummies are included in the probit estimates but not shown here.
37 The measure of productive efficiency continues to be the annual RE
firm-specific residual estimated from the translog production functions for
each year, which we normalize to have 0 mean and unitary standard
deviation.
38 Coefficients on more distant lags of the efficiency variable were sta-
tistically insignificant. Foreign investors hence seem to be guided by cur-
rent performance.
39 Given that SOEs are the base and the linear time trend captures the
interaction of state ownership and time, the estimates in table 5 indicate
that in the Czech Republic, foreign investors are more likely to acquire
domestic private firms than SOEs and that the probability of acquisitions
rises for all types of firms (but fastest for SOEs) over time. In Russia,
firms with mixed and private ownership have a lower base probability
than an SOE of being acquired by a foreign firm, but their mean probabil-
ity of being acquired by a foreign investor rises over time. Finally, in both
economies, the probability of a firm being acquired rises with the size of
its capital stock, indicating that foreign investors tend to acquire larger
rather than smaller firms.
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and innovation among firms that lag significantly behind.
According to this view, we should observe convergence
toward the frontier by the more efficient firms but diver-
gence or outright failure on the part of the less efficient
ones. To provide evidence on this hypothesis, we test
whether more efficient firms have a higher (lower) probabil-
ity than less efficient firms of moving up (down) in the over-
all distribution of productive efficiency in any given year.
We also check if the less efficient firms are more likely to
exit than the more efficient ones. To carry out these tests, we
assign firms to the bottom third, middle third, and top third
of the overall efficiency distribution on the basis of their
individual estimated efficiency in every year.40 Within each
ownership category, we calculate the average annual prob-
ability that a firm in a given efficiency group moves to one
of the other two efficiency groups, stays in the same group,
or exits the market during the 1992–2000 period. These
probabilities are reported in 3  4 annual transition matrices
for each ownership category in table 6, with the groups of
origin being given by the row names and the groups of desti-
nation by column names.41 Using the transition matrices for
the distance is useful because one can assess whether the
distance to the frontier is likely to persist over time.42
The proximity to the frontier hypothesis is supported by
the behavior of foreign firms in Russia and (to a lesser
extent) in the Czech Republic. It is contradicted, however,
by the behavior of all types of domestic firms in each coun-
try. As may be seen from table 6, the probability that for-
eign firms in the middle efficiency group move into the top
group is higher than the probability that foreign firms in the
bottom efficiency group move to the middle group (32.7%
versus 18.0% in Russia and 19.9% versus 14.6% in the
Czech Republic).43 Similarly, the probability that foreign
firms in the top efficiency group move down into the middle
group is smaller than the probability that they move from
the middle to the bottom group (8.8% versus 14.6% in Rus-
sia and 13.7% versus 14.7% in the Czech Republic). In con-
trast, the counterpart transition probabilities are virtually
indistinguishable within each of the three categories for
domestically owned firms in Russia, and they are actually
reversed in the Czech Republic. For example, in the Czech
Republic, the probability of moving from the bottom to the
middle group is higher than the probability of moving from
the middle to the top group within each domestic ownership
category (19.2% versus 14.7% for the SOEs, 15.1% versus
13.0% for the private firms and 17.9% versus 11.5% for
firms with mixed ownership). Similarly, the probability of
moving down from the middle to the bottom group is smal-
ler than moving from the top to the middle group within
two of the three domestic ownership categories, with pri-
vate firms being the exception.
Whereas we do find that exit rates are highest among the
least efficient firms, we do not find that the exit rates of
firms in the middle group of efficiency are higher than the
exit rates of firms in the highest group. Hence, the proxi-
TABLE 6.—AVERAGE ANNUAL TRANSITION PROBABILITIES OF EXISTING FIRM MOVING ACROSS EFFICIENCY GROUPS BY OWNERSHIP TYPE, 1992–2000
Czech Republic Russia
Bottom Middle Top Exit Bottom Middle Top Exit
Foreign
Bottom 0.782 0.146 0.049 0.023 Bottom 0.504 0.180 0.132 0.185
Middle 0.147 0.648 0.199 0.006 Middle 0.146 0.449 0.327 0.079
Top 0.018 0.137 0.833 0.012 Top 0.028 0.088 0.823 0.062
Mixed
Bottom 0.782 0.179 0.021 0.018 Bottom 0.694 0.163 0.022 0.121
Middle 0.191 0.685 0.115 0.010 Middle 0.180 0.596 0.168 0.056
Top 0.025 0.233 0.735 0.007 Top 0.036 0.187 0.718 0.059
Private
Bottom 0.801 0.151 0.018 0.031 Bottom 0.659 0.167 0.023 0.152
Middle 0.223 0.625 0.130 0.022 Middle 0.182 0.578 0.166 0.074
Top 0.019 0.199 0.755 0.027 Top 0.037 0.192 0.695 0.076
State
Bottom 0.679 0.192 0.056 0.073 Bottom 0.708 0.177 0.020 0.095
Middle 0.233 0.572 0.147 0.048 Middle 0.198 0.562 0.188 0.052
Top 0.042 0.247 0.662 0.050 Top 0.035 0.199 0.711 0.055
The average annual probabilities are based on a firm-specific measure of efficiency (E) obtained from the standardized residuals of the translog function estimated for each year separately (1992–2000), with industry
dummies and controls for data anomalies included. Based on its individual E measure, a firm is then categorized each year by where it falls in the distribution of Es: bottom, middle, or top third. All transition probabil-
ities are statistically significant at the 5% level (using bootstrapped standard errors), except for a middle-to-exit flow of foreign firms and a top-to-exit flow of firms with mixed ownership in the Czech Republic.
40 The measure of efficiency is again each firm’s residual from an
annual translog production function that is estimated without ownership
variables. Note that we are using a relative measure of distance from the
frontier, but that it is correlated with absolute distance.
41 We have computed the transition probabilities using simple ratios of
bins (i.e., for a given state, what the fraction of transitions is to another
state). The corresponding standard errors are calculated in two ways,
bootstrap and asymptotic, using (fraction  (1  fraction))/(number of
observations). The two methods produce similar results. We have also
obtained similar probabilities when we estimated a multinomial logit and
used the associated standard errors.
42 Since we carry out the ranking within the distribution of all firms, the
fact that a given (e.g., domestic private) firm moves up across categories
does not mean that a firm from the same group must move across the
same categories down.
43 The standard errors corresponding to the transition probabilities are
very small, indicating that the differences in the transition probabilities
that we discuss here are statistically significant at the 1% confidence
level.
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mity to the frontier hypothesis also does not receive much
support in the probabilities of exit if one ignores the exit
rates of the group of the least efficient firms that are likely
to have high exit rates in general for a variety of reasons.
The transition probabilities in table 6 also support our find-
ings in tables 3 and 4 that foreign firms increase their effi-
ciency more rapidly than domestic firms do. In both coun-
tries foreign firms are more likely to move up in the overall
efficiency distribution (especially into the top group) and
stay in the top group than are firms in any of the three
domestic ownership categories, which in turn display simi-
lar patterns of mobility. Firms with foreign ownership are
also less likely to move down in the overall distribution
than the other types of firms. The differential pattern of
mobility between the foreign and domestic firms is more
pronounced in Russia than in the Czech Republic. Our esti-
mates hence indicate that domestic firms are improving
their efficiency more slowly than the foreign-owned firms,
a finding that is consistent with the hypothesis that domestic
firms are adjusting more slowly than foreign firms.
Using the 3  3 sub-matrices reflecting the bottom, mid-
dle, and top efficiency states in table 6, we also calculate
the stationary probability matrices of efficiency by owner-
ship. With bootstrap standard errors being very small, we
find that in both economies, the stationary probability that
foreign-owned firms are in the top third of the overall effi-
ciency distribution is twice as high as the corresponding
probability for any of the three types of domestic firms. In
the Czech Republic, the stationary probability of the foreign
firms being in the top group is 0.45, while the correspond-
ing probabilities of the domestic private, mixed, and state
firms are 0.21, 0.22, and 0.26. In Russia, the corresponding
probability values are 0.69, 0.30, 0.29, and 0.30.44
Given that our analysis does not reveal signs of conver-
gence of domestic firms to the frontier, we examine directly
whether this is because domestic firms converge to a lower
(steady-state) level of efficiency than the foreign firms or
because they converge at a slower speed. In particular, we
estimate a dynamic conditional convergence equation of the
form
uip ¼ Zipjþ uip1Zipgþ Iipdþ Pmþ uip; ð4Þ
where uip is the logarithm of the average efficiency of each
firm i in each consecutive two-year period p, Zip is a vector
of categories of ownership (averaged across the two years
within each period p), j proxies the steady-state efficiency
levels of firms with different types of ownership, g is (the
negative of the log of) the speed of convergence of firms to
their ownership-specific steady-state efficiency level, Iip is a
set of industry dummy variables controlling for industry-
specific (e.g., technology) factors that may affect the
steady-state efficiency levels of firms, and P is a vector of
period dummies (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004).45 Equation
(4) hence allows both the steady state efficiency levels and
the speed of convergence to vary with ownership type. In
order to reduce the effects of short-term variations in the
data, we use for each firm its estimated two-year average
efficiency levels during the 1993–2000 period. We estimate
equation (4) by pooled OLS as well as by using the differ-
ence between the third and second lags as an instrumental
variable for the first lag of efficiency in our level equation
(Arellano & Bover, 1995). The OLS and IV estimates of j,
which may be seen in Sabirianova, Svejnar, and Terrell
(2005b), indicate that all three types of domestic firms are
converging to the same steady-state level (except possibly
for the mixed firms in the Czech Republic). Foreign firms
are converging to a higher steady-state level: 0.11 to 0.23
log points in the Czech Republic and a 0.34 to 0.40 log
points in Russia. The estimates of g suggest that in the
Czech Republic all four types of firms are converging to
their respective steady states at the same speed. In Russia,
foreign firms converge at a faster speed than the three types
of domestic firms, which are converging at the same speed.
IV. Conclusions
The Czech Republic and Russia represent important
alternative models of transition and implementation of the
market-oriented policies: the Central and East European
(CEE) model and the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) model, respectively. The two models differ markedly
in the degree to which they have opened their markets to
competition from trade and foreign direct investment and
the extent to which they have developed market-oriented
institutions and legal system. They hence provide alterna-
tive laboratories for testing the effects of the market-
oriented development policies on firm efficiency. We use
large firm-level data sets from these two countries to exam-
ine whether market liberalization from 1992 to 2000
enabled local firms to converge in efficiency to the world
standard, defined as the efficiency of foreign-owned firms
in these economies. In doing so, we provide microecono-
metric foundations for the debate about the effects of globa-
lization, privatization, and foreign direct investment (FDI)
on development.
The CEE and CIS countries carried out large-scale priva-
tizations on the presumption that this would increase the
efficiency of firms and speed up economic development. In
both sets of economies, observers and analysts have pointed
to success stories as well as evidence of mismanagement
and looting (tunneling) of firms. The Russian and Czech
privatization schemes fit into the large-scale privatization44 The stationary probability matrices also indicate that foreign-owned
firms are much less likely to be in the bottom tier of the efficiency distri-
bution. The respective stationary probabilities for the foreign, mixed, pri-
vate, and state firms are 0.26, 0.40, 0.45, and 0.38 for the Czech Republic,
and 0.13, 0.36, 0.36, and 0.37 in Russia.
45 Although the two literatures do not cross-reference each other, equa-
tion (6) can be shown to be in the same class of functions as that esti-
mated by Griffith, Redding, and Simpson (2009) on British firms.
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pattern, with the Russians providing assets primarily to insi-
ders and the Czechs primarily to outsiders. Our estimates
suggest that in the Czech Republic, the efficiency of firms
with domestic private and mixed ownership is quite similar
and only slightly (about 10%) higher than that of the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Depending on the estimation
method, in Russia the efficiency of the domestic private and
mixed ownership can be slightly higher or lower than that
of SOEs. These results suggest that a principal justification
for carrying out privatizations to domestic owners has not
been borne out by performance during the first post-privati-
zation decade.
FDI is widely viewed as a vehicle for development oper-
ating through the higher efficiency of the multinationals
and the positive spillover effects of foreign firms on domes-
tic firms’ efficiency. We find that foreign-owned firms are
much more efficient than domestic firms in both countries
and that the gap between domestic and foreign firms is not
closing. It has remained constant in the Czech Republic and
has grown in Russia. One factor contributing to this gap
appears to be that foreign-owned start-ups may be more
efficient than domestic start-ups. Foreign investors also tend
to acquire more efficient domestic firms, although the mag-
nitude of this effect is limited. Finally, we find that foreign-
owned firms are improving their efficiency more rapidly
than domestic firms and are converging to a higher level of
efficiency. It may be argued that we are observing the
short-term effects of FDI, as described in the Monge-
Naranjo (2008) model. While this may be the case, our
results cover an entire decade and thus provide sobering
evidence on how quickly one may expect policies to start
having the positive expected effect on development.
A growing literature is hypothesizing that market-
oriented development policies are more effective in increas-
ing efficiency and growth in firms and countries that are
closer to the technological frontier, but that the policies are
too overwhelming and may even cause failure in the less
efficient firms and countries. Our study provides evidence
related to this hypothesis at both the firm and country
levels. At the firm level, we find the hypothesis to be sup-
ported by the behavior of foreign-owned firms but not by
the three types of domestic firms. At the country level, we
find that the foreign-domestic efficiency gap is much larger
in Russia than in the Czech Republic and that it is increas-
ing in Russia while remaining relatively stable in the Czech
Republic over the 1992–2000 period. This supports the
hypothesis since in terms of its initial efficiency, the Czech
Republic is closer to the ‘‘frontier’’ than Russia.46
Both the CEE and CIS countries continue to face the
development challenge of how to bring their firms to the
world efficiency standard. The CEE economies are meeting
this challenge by rapidly increasing the shares of their GDP
and exports accounted for by foreign firms, an option that is
not readily open to all developing countries and raises the
question of whether foreign capital is too ‘‘footloose’’ to
constitute a reliable basis for long-term economic develop-
ment.47 In contrast, the Russian-style CIS economies are
falling further behind foreign efficiency standards, a failing
that will become increasingly acute as globalization pro-
ceeds and the CIS countries join the WTO and become
more open to foreign capital and competition. Our results
indicate that future research needs to examine carefully the
differential effect that development policies, FDI, and glo-
balization have on the performance of local versus foreign-
owned firms.
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